This study provides new evidence of systemic risk contribution in the international mutual fund sector from 2000-2011. The empirical analysis tracks the systemic risk of 10,570 mutual funds investing internationally. The main findings suggest that the systemic risk contributions of international mutual funds are more than proportional given the fund's size. Policy implications are discussed in terms of practicality of regulation, macroprudential approach, and risk-taking behavior of fund managers.
INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] has increased the attention of policymakers and academics on the scale and operation of interconnected financial systems, especially on what has become known as "too big to fail" in the global financial system. The designation of "systemically important financial institution" has recently extended to cover both banks and non-banks. 1 In this research, we study the systemic risk of the mutual fund sector in the global financial system. At the end of 2012, total net assets under management of mutual funds stood at US$26.8 trillion, accounting for more than 50% of global market capitalization.
2 Subject to redemptions, mutual funds may be faced with liquidity and financial market runs, thereby rendering the mutual fund sector too big to fail.
3 In this vein, we offer new evidence on systemic risk contribution based on mutual fund characteristics, investment performance, as well as their intertwining empirically.
Our measure of systemic risk contribution is a difference between systemic risk of the mutual fund sector (henceforth, systemic risk) conditional on mutual fund being in distress (performance base, i.e., investment return) vis-à-vis systemic risk of the mutual fund sector conditional on mutual fund being in normal state; henceforth (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2011) . The estimation of systemic risk contribution is done in three stages. Firstly, value at risk (VaR) is estimated for fund using quantile regression. Secondly, systemic risk conditional on mutual fund being in distress as well as systemic risk conditional on mutual fund being in normal state, are estimated from fund-specific VaR. Thirdly, is calculated.
Applying to weekly data of 10,570 mutual funds from October 2000 to June 2011, we track the systemic risk of mutual funds globally. The findings shed light on possible channels of global risk transmission through mutual funds, i.e., fire sales by distress funds holding common assets, market sentiment driven by fund flows, and active portfolio management transmitting shocks across markets.
4
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on granularity in macroeconomics (Gabaix 2011) . Jinjarak and Zheng (2014) provided related evidence on what would have been the pattern of risk if, say, regulations would have capped the size of funds at a ceiling that would have eliminated the top 20. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the methodology of estimating the time-varying systemic risk contribution . Section 3 describes the data and the summary statistics of these risk measures. Section 4 discusses the implications. Section 5 concludes. 1 The Economist (2012) discussed relevant rules brought on by regulators in the United States, expanding to insurers, asset management funds, private equity firms, hedge funds, and mutual funds. 2 Investment Company Institute (5 April 2013). 3 On liquidity and financial market runs, and the role of international investors in crisis, see, for instance, Bernardo and Welch (2004) and Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda (2012) . 4 See, for example, Ben-Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl (2012); Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012) ; Coval and Stafford (2007); Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012) ; Raddatz and Schmukler (2011); Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart (2006) ; Goldstein and Pauzner (2004); and Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2001) .
ESTIMATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK CONTRIBUTION

Definition of and
Let be the return variable for mutual fund , and the value at risk ( ) that measures the individual risk of fund . For a given probability , the tail risk equals the negative value of the th quantile of :
Essentially, represents a loss percentage and is conventionally reported as a positive number. Eq.(1) follows such sign convention: 5 the greater is, the riskier fund is. Denote as the return of the global mutual fund sector, which is calculated as the total net assets (TNA)-weighted return of all funds in the sample. Based on Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) , the conditional systemic risk, |ℂ( ) , is defined as the of the global mutual fund sector contingent on fund being in state ℂ( ):
The conditional systemic risk, |ℂ( ) , is calculated as the negative value of th quantile of conditional on state ℂ( ). Two financial states are of interest: the distress state, with fund being at risk such that = − , and the median state, with = − 50% . The systemic risk contribution of fund to the global mutual fund sector, | , is defined as the difference between the systemic risk conditional on fund being in distress and the systemic risk conditional on fund being in the median state:
This way | captures the risk transmitted from fund to the global mutual fund sector. However, it does not differentiate whether the systemic risk contribution is driven by the idiosyncratic risk of fund or by common factors that affect every fund simultaneously. Such a property enables us to analyze how systemic risk responds to internal dynamics and exogenous shocks. If the systemic risk contribution measured in such a broad way turns out to be low, it suggests the risk of these funds is unlikely to be harmful to the whole sector. If, however, the systemic risk contribution is high, exploring its origins is useful for imposing regulations.
Estimation of and
To capture the time variation in the joint distribution of , the return of the mutual fund sector, and , the return of mutual fund , we follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) to estimate the conditional distribution as a function of various state variables. 5 A negative means that the fund may still make a profit even when the rare adverse event happens. For example, for a fund with US$1 under management, a 5% of −0.1 means that the fund has a 5% chance of making a profit of less than US$0.1 or a 95% chance of making a profit of more than US$0.1. Specifically, we run the following th quantile regression conditional on a vector of lagged state variables −1 :
where −1 includes the return of the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World Index ( MSCI_Global ), the difference between the 3-month and overnight London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) ( 3m−o/n ), the difference between the overnight LIBOR and the federal funds target rate ( o/n − ), 6 the difference between the Chicago Board of Trade's (CBOT) federal funds futures rate and the 3-month treasury rate ( − 3m ), the difference between federal funds futures rate and federal funds target rate ( − ), 7 and the return of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index ( ).
While the ordinary least square estimates the coefficients by minimizing the sum of the squared residuals, the quantile regression finds the solution by minimizing the sum of the absolute residuals weighted by the quantile (Koenker and Bassett 1978) . In the th quantile regression, the conditional quantile of the error term , and | , satisfy that ( , | −1 ) = 0 and ( | , | , −1 ) = 0 . Such specifications allow us to estimate the coefficients consistently even if the data is not Gaussian distributed.
The time-varying tail risk of fund , , , is calculated as the negative of the predicted value from the th quantile regression based on Eq. (4):
where ^ and ^ are the estimated coefficients from the quantile regression based on Eq.(4). The systemic risk of the global mutual fund sector conditional on fund being in distress, | (or
), is computed as the negative of the predicted value from the th quantile regression based on Eq.(5), conditional on the individual fund being in distress ( , = − , ) such that
Following from Eq.(3), the time-varying systemic risk contribution of fund is given by
Estimating th quantile regressions based on Eqs. (4) and (5) for every mutual fund in our sample, we obtain panel data of weekly , , | , and | , . The parameter typically takes a value of 1% or 5% in practice. 6 See Hamilton (2008) who distinguished between 3 − / and / − as liquidity premium and risk premium. 7 See Kuttner (2001) for the decomposition of the monetary policy change into expected and unexpected components. The methods are relatively practical and efficient in capturing the market's response to monetary policy; see also Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Wongswan (2009) .
We choose = 1%7 F 8 as the default value in the following estimations and drop the superscript from these variables in the remaining part of this paper.
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Data
The weekly fund-level data are from Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR). The sample covers equity funds investing in both developed and emerging markets from 20 October 2000 to 8 June 2011 (554 weeks). Key fund characteristics include total net assets (TNA) under management, investment flows measured as a ratio to TNA, and returns calculated as the weekly change in net asset value (NAV) divided by the NAV of the previous week. The data used to construct state variables (MSCI world index, 3-month and overnight LIBOR, federal funds target rate, CBOT's federal funds futures rate, and VIX) are obtained from Datastream and Bloomberg.
The fund data is screened in standard procedures following Coval and Stafford (2007) and Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012) . First, we exclude funds with TNAs of less than US$5 million throughout the sample period. Second, we drop funds with investment flows or returns falling out of the range [−50%, 200%] . 8F 9 Third, we keep only funds with a total number of observations of more than 30 weeks. The final sample includes 1,574,254 fund weeks, covering 10,570 distinct funds investing worldwide. In order to study the individual fund's systemic risk contribution, we will focus primarily on in the following. The left panel of Figure 1 plots the time-series average of the (y-axis) against (x-axis) using all 10,570 funds in the sample. It shows that the individual risk is positively related to its systemic risk contribution . The two variables have a correlation coefficient of 0.35. They are not only correlated cross sectionally but over time. Focusing on the cross-sectional average of and for the top 20% largest funds indicates that the two variables exhibit strong co-movement in their time series, as shown in the right panel of Figure 1 . Their correlation coefficient is as high as 0.9.
Summary Statistics
8 The estimates using = 5% do not alter our main results and are available upon request. 9 There are 9 fund weeks with returns falling out of the range [−50%, 200%] in the initial raw sample (before restricting the TNA to be more than US$5 million. Imposing constraints on flows and returns efficiently filters out fund weeks at the early stage of establishment and at the time of exit, when the data is relatively noisy. 10 The estimation coefficients on the macro state variables based on Eqs. (4) and (5) Unlike the risk within the banking industry documented in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) , the observed cross-sectional and time-serial correlation suggest that a fund's is informative in forecasting its systemic risk contribution . It seems to suggest that regulation based on the individual fund's risk could be useful. Nonetheless, this forecasting power of on is not perfect. As shown in the left panel of Figure 1 , there are a small number of funds with positive but negative , suggesting the financially distressing conditions of these funds have the opposite effect on the systemic risk of the whole mutual fund industry. However, these outliers account for only 0.4% of asset under management. To be prudent in evaluating the systemic importance of the individual fund, we rely on which covers the systemic risk contribution arising from both internal dynamics and exogenous shocks. 
Persistence of
At the beginning of each week, we sort all mutual funds in ascending order according to their estimated . Based on this ranking, we group the funds into five quintile portfolios, with quintile 1 (Q1) funds having the smallest , i.e., systemically safe funds, and quintile 5 (Q5) funds having the largest , i.e., systemically risky funds. Table 2 reports the probability of fund transiting from quintile in period to quintile in period + 1. The reported probability is calculated as the total number of funds switching from quintile into quintile in period + 1 divided by the total number of funds in quintile in period . To account for possible survival bias, the probability of funds dropping from the sample in period + 1 is reported in the column titled Attrition Rate. The diagonals reflect the probability of the funds staying in the same quintile in the subsequent week. Evidently, funds tend to remain in the same quintile over the sample period. This persistence is especially the case at the tail ends for Q1 (systemically safe) funds and Q5 (systemically risky) funds. Notes: This table reports the probability for funds in quintile in period to switch to quintile in period + 1. Each cell value is calculated as the total number of funds transiting from quintile to quintile in period + 1 divided by the total number of funds in quintile in period . The probability of funds dropping from the sample at + 1 is reported in the column "Attrition Rate" to account for survival bias. The persistence of systemic risk contribution decays slowly over time.
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Figure 2 tracks the equal-weighted average of the quintile portfolios over 104 weeks (approximately 2 years) after their formation. Although the difference shrinks gradually, the is consistently higher in week + ( = 1, . . . ,104) for a portfolio that is systemically riskier in week .
DISCUSSION
The estimated systemic risk contribution is useful in studying other aspects of mutual fund investment internationally. For instance, we can examine whether funds with higher systemic risk contribution have higher investment flows and returns in the tranquil period and lower investment flows and returns in the panic period. Further, it will be interesting to see if the impacts of systemic risk contribution on investment flows and returns are regime-dependent. On evaluating the determinants of systemic risk contribution, one can study whether larger funds leads to higher systemic risk contribution and the fund size effect is particularly pronounced during the panic period.
Moreover, the systemic risk measure can be used to study whether there is a nonlinear relation between the mutual funds' prospective performance and their systemic risk contribution. Funds with more negative prospective flows (prospective outflows) should be associated with lower systemic risk contribution. The outflows reduce fund size and therefore its systemic importance. On the other hand, expecting significant outflows, fund managers may become cautious with their investment, i.e., holding more liquid assets that can be quickly sold, which reduces the fund-specific risk and therefore systemic risk contribution. The nonlinear relationship may imply that higher prospective flows result in lower systemic risk contribution if the prospective flows are large enough. This possibility may be driven by fund managers' intention to maintain stable flow streams that keep the flow volatility low and improve fund performance (Rakowski 2010 ).
In addition, any nonlinear relation between prospective returns and systemic risk contribution may indicate that worse prospective returns lead to lower systemic risk contribution when the prospective returns are relatively low. The prospective returns may motivate the mutual fund managers to deliberately reduce their choice of risk over time (Brown, Harlow, and Starks 1996; Chevalier and Ellison 1997, 1999; Kempf and Ruenzi 2008; Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele 2009; Chen and Pennacchi 2009; Huang, Sialm, and Zhang 2011) , and therefore the systemic risk contribution. As summarized in Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) , mutual fund managers have the compensation incentive to compete for more investment flows and higher returns by increasing their risk levels, and the employment incentive to keep risk low in order to maintain the liquidity and the safety of their asset holdings. When prospective returns are sufficiently negative, funds are expected to suffer from large investment outflows. If fund managers increase their risk further, the probability of fire sales is likely to be high, and their occurrence further distresses fund performance and threatens fund managers' job security. In such a situation, the employment incentive is likely to dominate the compensation incentive. When the prospective returns are relatively high, higher prospective returns are associated with lower systemic risk contribution. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) ; Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009); Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996); and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) found that outperforming funds reduce their 11 See Santa-Clara and Yan (2010) for more evidence of risk persistence. subsequent risk.
12 It is likely that the employment incentive dominates the compensation incentive when the returns are sufficiently positive, as fund managers are more concerned about their career and reputation (Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele 2009) . Therefore, they tend to act prudently to maintain a consistent performance record and keep their investment safe, rather than trying to improve their performance further. Such incentives for choosing risk at the fund level seem to apply in the variation of systemic risk contribution.
Limitations of our systemic risk measure on international mutual funds are in order. First, this measure may not fully differentiate whether systemic risk contribution is driven by idiosyncratic risk or common factors. Therefore, it is difficult to impose regulation calibrated on a factor. Under efficient markets, co-movements of financial institutions' risk measures should convey information on both direct and indirect linkages across financial institutions (IMF 2009). Second, here mutual fund is in distress when return is low or negative. Given that mutual funds have no explicit leverage, it is a challenge to justify or motivate the "distress" of a mutual fund. Several possibilities include, for instance: severe and persistent redemptions may be a better sign of distress for an open-ended fund; low absolute return or under-performance against the benchmark; and aversion to be the worst performer among the peers may matter more. Third, it remains to be seen whether the absolute size of a fund matters in practice. In terms of the impact on asset prices and systemic risk, a more meaningful factor may be the presence of a fund active in a specific market compared to the size/liquidity of the asset market (big fish in a small pond). An even more important aspect is correlation across mutual funds due to clustering of investor flows and fund managers' purchase and/or sale of assets as well as common use of a benchmark. Even though individual funds or individual investors are small in size, when they move in the same direction their market impact will be large (Miyajima and Shim 2014) ; also redemption-driven sales and fund manager sales are positively correlated (Shek, Shim, and Shin 2015) . This implies a macroprudential approach is more important than a microprudential approach on individual funds' risks. Fourth, our findings are squared with an IMF study (albeit with smaller number of funds). IMF GFSR (2015) used Adrian and Brunnermeier's (2011) CoVaR and ran quantile regressions on about 1,500 funds investing in different asset classes. The study found that funds' contribution to systemic risk depends more on their investment focus (that is, asset class) than on their size; the average contribution to systemic risk does not increase with a fund's parent company's size.
CONCLUSIONS
We offer new evidence of systemic risk contribution in the international mutual fund sector from 2000 to 2011. Our analysis of 10,570 funds tracks the systemic risk of the global mutual fund sector that can increase from financial distress at the fund level. Empirically, the systemic risk contributions of international mutual funds, be they originated from idiosyncratic risks and/or common factors that affect the mutual fund industry, are found to be more than proportionally larger given the fund's size.
Possible extensions can be built on the estimated systemic risk contribution. We can derive potential implications on investment performance of the mutual fund sector, focusing on systemically important mutual funds vis-à-vis the others. It will be useful to examine whether systemic risk contribution is negatively (positively) associated with net investment inflow and return performance in a crisis (non-crisis) period. The extension can also study any non-linear relationship between systemic contribution and prospective net investment inflows and return performance. Further, while the size of the mutual fund drives systemic risk contribution, the effect may be more than proportionally larger for systemically important funds, especially during panic periods in the financial markets.
For the past decade, total net assets of mutual funds investing in Asia and the Pacific have been around US$3 trillion, equivalent to more than 10% of worldwide total net assets of mutual funds. 13 To put this number into perspective, the investment is more than a third of the People's Republic of China's gross domestic product (GDP), Japan's GDP, or twice the size of the Republic of Korea's GDP. The global financial crisis is a watershed event for monetary authorities and regulators to take preemptive action on the financial sector. Understanding systemically important financial institutions and their investment patterns should be the prerequisite for policy implementation.
